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Abstract 
 
In this paper ambiguity aversion is measured through the maximum price the decision 
maker is willing to pay in order to know the probability of an event. Two comparative 
problems are examined in which the decision maker faces an act: in one case buying 
information implies playing a lottery, while in the other case buying information gives 
also the option to avoid playing the lottery. In both decision settings, relying on Choquet 
expected utility model, we study how the decision maker’s risk and ambiguity attitudes 
affect the reservation price for information. These effects are analyzed for different levels 
of ambiguity of the act. 
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1. Introduction 
 
The analysis of choice under ambiguity is one of the fundamental problems studied by 
decision theorists in the last decades. One of the first theorists addressing this issue was 
Knight (1921), who distinguished between “measurable” uncertainty or risk, with known 
probabilities, and “unmeasurable” uncertainty, with unknown probabilities. Even though 
Knight’s distinctions did not play a role in the Savage expected utility model (Savage, 
1954), the Ellsberg paradox (Ellsberg, 1961) reintroduced the importance of ambiguity in 
affecting decision making. This gave rise to experimental research on subjects’ attitudes 
toward uncertainty, that is extensively reviewed in Camerer and Weber (1992). 
Facing rich empirical evidence pointing to ambiguity aversion, various alternatives to 
Savage subjective expected utility theory have been proposed. Among these alternative 
theories, a clear formalization of ambiguity aversion is provided by Schmeidler’s (1989) 
Choquet expected utility model with convex capacities, the multiple prior model of 
Gilboa and Schmeidler (1989), the smooth second-order prior model of Klibanoff et al. 
(2005) and the variational preferences model of Maccheroni et al. (2006). Each model 
allows to construct its own index of ambiguity aversion. However, these indexes have 
been rarely used in the experimental research, mainly because of the complexity in 
eliciting the fundamental variables on which they are based. 2 
In order to fill the gap between the theoretical characterization of ambiguity aversion and 
its experimental analysis, this paper links the subject’s risk and ambiguity attitude to a 
variable that can be easily observed in the lab: the subject’s reservation price for 
information about the probability of an unknown event. The idea that information 
reducing ambiguity has a positive value for ambiguity averse subjects has been already 
explored in the literature. Quiggin (2007), using Machina’s (2004) concept of almost-
objective acts, shows that ambiguity aversion may be defined in terms of the value of 
information. He states that, for expected utility preferences, the value of information with 
respect to almost-objective acts is asymptotically equal to zero. Snow (2010) studies the 
value of information in a non-expected utility model of ambiguity with second-order 
probabilities, an adaptation of the model of Klibanoff et al. (2005).  He proves that the 
value of information that resolves ambiguity increases with greater ambiguity and with 
greater ambiguity aversion. However, he does not explore the effect of risk aversion on 
the value of information that resolves ambiguity. In this paper, instead, we focus on the 
                                                 
2 Among recent experimental works aiming to estimate parametric models of ambiguity aversion, see 
Halevy (2007), Dominiak and Schnedler (2010), Ahn et al. (2010). 
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interplay between risk and ambiguity attitudes in determining the decision maker’s 
reservation price for information that resolves ambiguity, for different levels of 
ambiguity. Furthermore, to provide a characterization of ambiguity aversion that can be 
easily adopted for an experimental test, we rely on Choquet expected utility model rather 
than on Klibanoff et al. (2005). In the former model, a rigorous experimental analysis of 
risk and ambiguity aversion would require to elicit the decision maker’s utility function 
and her subjective beliefs on events, respectively. In the latter approach, given that 
ambiguity preferences are specifically captured by a nondecreasing transformation 
function defined on expected utility, we would need in addition to elicit this function. 
Finally, in the last part of the paper we examine the relation between the option value of 
information and its value in terms of ambiguity resolution. 
We consider a simple decision problem under uncertainty, in which the subject should 
choose whether to buy or not buy information about the probability of an unknown event. 
As mentioned above, we measure her degree of ambiguity aversion through the 
maximum price she is willing to pay in order to know the objective probability of the 
event, for a generic utility function, that is for different risk aversion levels.  
First, in a decision setting in which the subject should play an act, we derive an analytical 
relation between the reservation price for information about the objective probability of 
an event and the (subjective) capacity of this event. In this case, if the expected utility 
model holds, information should not have any economic value for the subject, given that 
even after buying information she should play the lottery. Since the choice to pay in 
order to know the objective probability cannot be rationalized in Savage’s expected 
utility model, we move to Choquet expected utility and we find that an ambiguity averse 
subject is willing to pay a positive price for such information, since she prefers to know 
the probabilities, that is to participate in a lottery rather than to participate in an act. 
Then, we slightly modify the decision setting, by allowing the subject to choose whether 
to play or not play the lottery in case she buys information about the probability of the 
event. In this setting, information does have an additional economic value, namely the 
option value in the subject’s subsequent choice.  
In both information settings, we analyze how the subject’s willingness to pay for 
information changes when the level of ambiguity decreases. For a given level of 
ambiguity of the act the subject should play, once her reservation price for information is 
known, the corresponding capacity of the event can be easily calculated and ambiguity 
aversion can be measured accordingly. We argue that the two comparative decision 
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problems proposed in this paper could be easily implemented in a laboratory experiment 
to measure subjects’ ambiguity aversion through the price they are ready to pay to surely 
know the probability of an event. 
 
 
2. The decision problem 
 
Consider an urn with gn  green balls and  blue balls. The Decision Maker (DM 
henceforth) knows the total number of balls g bn n n= + , but she does not know gn  and 
. We are interested in the DM’s valuation of the act ( , ; , )h h ha x s x s−=  with ,h g b=  
she has to participate in, where  represents her gain if the event hs  occurs (if the act is 
ga , a green ball is drawn) and  is her gain if hs−  occurs (if the act is ga , a blue ball is 
drawn), with ,x x +∈\  and xx > . The two events ,g bs s  are mutually incompatible 
( )g bs s∩ =∅  and exhaustive ( g bs s S∪ = , where S  is the set of all possible events). Let 
us indicate with Pr( )hs  the probability that a h-color ball is drawn, with Pr( ) 0≥hs  for 
,h g b= , and Pr( ) Pr( ) 1g bs s+ = . 
Let  be the maximum price the DM is willing to pay in order to know the ratio 
between h-color balls and the total number of balls in the urn, i.e. the probability that a  
h-color ball is drawn, Pr( ) = hh ns n  for ,h g b= . Thus, V is the DM’s reservation price for 
“full” information about the urn composition, i.e. for information that resolves 
ambiguity. We assume that the DM’s choice is dichotomous: she can buy full 
information or not buy information at all. Therefore, throughout in the paper, the 
expression “buy information” always stands for “buy information that resolves 
ambiguity”. 
Assume that the DM’s preferences are represented by the von Neumann–Morgenstern 
expected utility function in case of choice under risk (i.e., concerning lotteries, with 
known probabilities of the events) and by the Choquet expected utility function in case of 
choice under (risk and) ambiguity (i.e., referring to acts, with unknown probabilities of 
the events), with :u →\ \  being the correspondent utility function over the outcomes in 
both models. This function is assumed to be strictly increasing, that is ( ) ( )u x u x′ >  if and 
only if x x′ > . 
bn
bn
x
x
V
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2.1    Buying Information without using it 
 
We assume that if the DM does not buy information, she has to participate in the act. Let 
us first consider the case in which, even if the DM buys information about  Pr( )gs  and 
Pr( )bs , she has to play, i.e. she has to participate in the lottery. Hence, she does not have 
the option to give up playing the lottery if she does not “like” the revealed composition 
of the urn. The decision problem, with respect to act ga , is described in Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. Choosing between an act and a lottery through buying information 
 
In Figure 1, branch Ag indicates the choice of playing act ag, so that the DM’s final 
wealth is equal to the initial one, , decreased by the price 0P≥  paid to participate in 
the act, and increased by the random outcome of the act, ( )gx a . Branch Ig or, 
equivalently, Lg, represents the choice of buying information about the probabilities of 
the events of act ag, by paying the price Vg. In that case, the probabilities of the two 
events are fully revealed to the DM, so she plays a lottery determined by the act and the 
known probabilities of the events, ( ,Pr( ); ,Pr( ))g g bx s x s=A . Thus, her final wealth is 
equal to 0 ( )g gw V P x− − + A , where  ( )gx A  is the random outcome of the lottery. Notice 
that the participation price P does not influence the DM’s choice in Figure 1. We 
introduce it here for a comparative analysis with the decision problem that will be 
discussed in section 2.2, in which P does play a role. For convenience, define also 
.  
The condition for indifference between branch Ag and branch Lg determines the relation 
between the capacity of the favorable event, ( )gv s , and Vg, the maximum price the DM is 
0w
0w w P= −
I Lg g≡  Pr( )gs  
Pr( )bs
gs  
bs  
Ag  
ga  
gA  
0w P x− +  
0w P x− +  
0 gw V P x− − +
0 gw V P x− − +  
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willing to pay in order to know the probability of this event, Pr( )gs . The expected utility 
of branch Lg is ( )( ) ( ) 1 Pr( ) ( )Pr( )g g g g gEU w V u w x V s u w x V s− + = + − − + + −A , that can 
be rewritten as ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( )g g g g gEU w V u w x V u w x V u w x V s− + = + − + + − − + −A . 
We calculate the expected utility of branch Ag of the decision tree using the Choquet 
expected utility function ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )g gCEU w a u w x u w x u w x v s+ = + + + − + . 3 
Then, we impose the indifference condition between branch Ag and branch Lg,  
( ) ( )g g gCEU w a EU w V+ = − + A , which leads to 
                
( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( )
( )
( ) ( )
g g g g
g
u w x V u w x u w x V u w x V s
v s
u w x u w x
+ − − + + + − − + −= + − +       
(1.a) 
Let us now reframe the problem represented in Figure 1, by considering the mirrored act 
( , ; , )b b ga x s x s= , with the highest outcome x  associated to the event bs  and the lowest 
outcome x  to the event gs . By imposing that the DM is indifferent between branch Ab 
and branch Lb, we obtain a relation between the DM’s reservation price for information 
and the capacity of the favorable event, that is similar to (1.a), with the substitution of the 
subscript b for g: 
                
( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) Pr( )( )
( ) ( )
b b b b
b
u w x V u w x u w x V u w x V sv s
u w x u w x
+ − − + + + − − + −= + − +         (1.b) 
There is no reason for a Choquet expected utility DM to set g bV V≠ . Since symmetric 
information with respect to the occurrence of events should result in equal capacities (see 
Schmeidler, 1989), the equality between the two DM’s reservation prices for the two 
mirrored acts is a minimal condition for rationality. Thus, we can assume, without loss of 
generality, that g bV V= , and indicate them with V. From relations (1.a) and (1.b), and 
taking into account that Pr( ) Pr( ) 1g bs s+ = , we obtain 
                
( ) ( ) 2 ( )( ) ( )
( ) ( )g b
u w x V u w x V u w xv s v s
u w x u w x
+ − + + − − ++ = + − +                             
(1.c) 
and, consequently, the index of ambiguity aversion, based on Schmeidler’s (1989) 
proposal of uncertainty premium, is 
                
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )g b
u w x u w x V u w x u w x Vv s v s
u w x u w x
+ − + − + + − + −− − = + − +                 (2) 
                                                 
3 Notice that, in the Choquet expected utility of act ga , only capacity ( )gv s  appears. Then, in order to 
elicit capacity ( )bv s , we have to take into account act ba  in the analysis, as we do below.  
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Expression (2) relates subject’s ambiguity attitude with her reservation price for 
information about the probability of the unknown event. The index of subject’s 
ambiguity attitude is an increasing function of V and is positive (negative) if the DM is 
ambiguity averse (lover). The maximum price she is willing to pay to be informed is zero 
if and only if the DM is ambiguity neutral (whatever her attitude towards risk). In this 
case, (2) gives ( ) ( ) 1g bv s v s+ = , that is capacity is additive, i.e. it is a probability. 
If the DM is risk neutral but not ambiguity neutral ( 0V ≠ ), relation (2) becomes 
          
21 ( ) ( )g b
Vv s v s
x x
− − = −                           
(3) 
which is the index of attitude towards ambiguity for a risk neutral DM. In this case, 
ambiguity aversion is directly measured through the DM’s reservation price in relative 
terms. If the DM is not risk neutral, then, using the Taylor expansion of the DM’s utility 
function, (2) can be rewritten as 4 
   
( )1 0.5 ( )
2 ( )1 ( ) ( ) ( )1 0.5 ( )
( )
g b
u w x x V
V u wv s v s u wx x x x
u w
′′+ + −′− − ⋅ ′′− + +′

                   
(4)
  
so that if ( ) ( )0
( )
u w
u w
′′ < >′ , then 
21 ( ) ( ) ( )g b
Vv s v s
x x
− − > < −  in (4). Notice that 
( )
( )
u w
u w
′′− ′  is 
the de Finetti-Arrow-Pratt measure of risk aversion. Therefore, for an ambiguity averse 
DM, given 0V > , the reservation price of a risk averse (lover) DM in (4) is lower 
(higher) than the one in (3) and it decreases (increases) in the de Finetti-Arrow-Pratt 
index. This means that the maximum price an ambiguity averse DM is willing to pay for 
ambiguity resolution is, ceteris paribus (i.e. for a given degree of ambiguity aversion) 
reduced by risk aversion, as formally stated below.5 
Result 1. For an ambiguity averse Choquet expected utility DM, the reservation price for 
information about the probability of the unknown event depends positively on her degree 
of ambiguity aversion and negatively on her degree of risk aversion. If the DM is 
                                                 
4 Relation (4) holds under the condition that the Taylor expansion provides a sufficiently good 
approximation of the DM’s utility function. Therefore, it has been obtained by assuming 
2( ) ( ) '( ) 0.5 "( )u w y u w u w y u w y+ + +  and applying it for , , ,y x V x x V x= − − . 
5 In case of an ambiguity lover DM, given that ( )V−  is her reservation price for information reception, 
relation (4) can be rewritten as
( )1 0.5 ( ( ))
2( ) ( )( ) ( ) 1
( )1 0.5 ( )
( )
.g b
u w x x V
V u wv s v s
u wx x x x
u w
′′+ + + −′−+ − ⋅ ′′− + +′
  
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ambiguity lover, given that her reservation price for information is negative, the 
minimum price she would be willing to accept in order to receive information is 
increasing both in her love for ambiguity and in her aversion to risk. 
The intuition behind Result 1 can be summarized as follows. An ambiguity averse DM 
would pay for ambiguity resolution. However, according to (4), this payment represents a 
sure loss in order to switch from an act to a lottery which, although unambiguous, is as 
risky as the act. Thus, her willingness to pay is lower the higher her aversion to risk. If 
instead she is ambiguity lover, she prefers not to know the probabilities of the events, so 
she must be paid to be willing to accept ambiguity resolution: the more risk averse she is, 
the higher the sure amount she asks for. 
Let us examine how the DM’s reservation price for ambiguity resolution changes with 
the level of ambiguity of the decision setting. Consider two comparative information 
settings concerning the urn with gn  green balls and  blue balls introduced at the 
beginning of section 2. In the first setting, ( )α , the DM knows only that in the urn there 
are n green and blue balls, but she does not know how many of them are green and how 
many are blue. In the second setting, ( )β , the DM knows that in the urn there are at least 
gn  green balls and at least bn  blue balls, with { }, 0,1,..., 1g bn n n∈ −  and g bn n n+ < . 
Therefore, in setting ( )α  the DM faces a more ambiguous act than the one faced in 
setting ( )β . Correspondingly, if she buys information, the reduction in ambiguity is 
greater in ( )α  than in ( )β . 
Let us indicate with jV and ( )j hv s  respectively the DM’s reservation price and capacity 
for the event ,h g b=  in the ( )j  information setting, with , .j α β=  The relation 
determining the DM’s reservation price for ambiguity resolution about the urn 
composition is (2), with ( ) [0,1]hv s
α ∈  and ( ) ,h hh n n nv s n n
β −⎡ ⎤−∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, ,h g b= . If the DM is 
ambiguity averse, then [ )( ) ( ) 0,1g bv s v sα α+ ∈  and ( ) ( ) ,1g bg b n nv s v s nβ β
+⎡ ⎞+ ∈ ⎟⎢⎣ ⎠
. If 
instead she is ambiguity lover, then ( ]( ) ( ) 1, 2g bv s v sα α+ ∈  and 
2
( ) ( ) 1, g bg b
n n n
v s v s
n
β β − −⎛ ⎤+ ∈⎜ ⎥⎝ ⎦
 . 
bn
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Therefore, if the DM is “highly” ambiguity averse when facing the greater ambiguity 
level of the ( )α  setting, i.e. ( ) ( ) 0, g bg b
n n
v s v s
n
α α +⎡ ⎤+ ∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, we can easily state that 
V Vα β≥ . Similarly, if she is “highly” ambiguity lover when facing the greater ambiguity 
level of the ( )α  setting, i.e. 
2
( ) ( ) , 2g bg b
n n n
v s v s
n
α α − −⎡ ⎤+ ∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, then .V Vα β− ≥ −  For all 
other values of the DM’s capacities, there is no rationality condition that can be imposed 
on the capacities emerging in the ( )β  setting. Thus, in order to provide a deeper 
understanding of how the DM’s risk and ambiguity attitudes affect V for different levels 
of ambiguity of the decision setting, we determine the threshold values of V, namely for 
the two extreme cases of maximum aversion to ambiguity and maximum love for 
ambiguity. Relying on the ( )α  setting as a benchmark, we examine how the smaller 
ambiguity characterizing the ( )β  setting affects these values. 
Let us indicate with jV  ( )jV  the reservation price for ambiguity resolution of the most 
ambiguity averse (lover) DM in the ( )j  information setting, with , .j α β=  
In the ( )α  setting, maximum aversion to ambiguity is represented by ( ) ( ) 0g bv s v s= = . 
Then, taking into account relation (2), V α  is implicitly determined by the relation 
                                             ,
( ) 2 ( )
x x x
u w x V u w xα
=
+ − = +∑      
                                       
(5)
 
If the DM is risk neutral, then 
2
x xV α −= . Maximum love for ambiguity is represented 
by ( ) ( ) 1g bv s v s= = . Then, V α  is implicitly determined by the relation 
                                             ,
( ) 2 ( )
x x x
u w x V u w xα
=
+ − = +∑
                                           
(6) 
In order for (6) to hold, V α must be negative. Thus, V α−  is the price the most ambiguity 
lover DM would pay in order to avoid receiving information. Notice that for all 
,V V Vα α⎡ ⎤∉⎣ ⎦  we can state that the DM is not rational according to Choquet expected 
utility theory. In fact, V V α<  implies ( ) ( ) 2g bv s v s+ > . Similarly, V V α>  implies 
( ) ( ) 0g bv s v s+ < . If the DM is risk neutral, then 2
x xV α −= − , so that 0V Vα α+ = . If the 
DM is not risk neutral, this equality does not hold. In particular, the following result can 
be proved. 
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Result 2. If the Choquet expected utility DM is strictly risk averse, that is, if her utility 
function is strictly concave, then 0V Vα α+ < , i.e. the reservation price for information 
of the most ambiguity averse DM is lower in absolute value than that of the most 
ambiguity lover DM. 
Proof. Let us prove the statement by contradiction. Assume that 0V V zα α+ = ≥ . Then 
relations (5) and (6) would require 
                      ( )
,
2( ( ) ( )) ( ) ( )
x x x
u w x u w x u w x V z u w x Vα α
=
+ − + = + + − − + −∑                  (7) 
Strict concavity of u and 0z ≥  would require 
                   ( ) ( ) 2( ( ) ( ))u w x V z u w x V u w x V z u w xα α α+ + − − + − > + + − − +       (8.a) 
                  ( ) ( ) 2( ( ) ( ))u w x V z u w x V u w x V z u w xα α α+ + − − + − > + + − − +       (8.b) 
Considering (8.a) and (8.b) together, we would obtain 
        ( ) ( )
, ,
( ) ( ) 2 ( ) ( )
x x x x x x
u w x V z u w x V u w x V z u w xα α α
= =
+ + − − + − > + + − − +∑ ∑        (9) 
The left-hand side of (9) is equal to 2( ( ) ( ))u w x u w x+ − + , because of (7). Also the 
right-hand side, with V α in place of V z
α− + , is equal to 2( ( ) ( ))u w x u w x+ − + , because 
of (6). Therefore, contradiction implies that 0z < , that is 0V Vα α+ < . ■ 
Result 2 strengthens Result 1 in suggesting that risk aversion produces different effects 
on the reservation price of an ambiguity averse and of an ambiguity lover subject, 
respectively. Consider two equally risk averse DMs, having the same (strictly concave) 
utility function, but with opposite and mirrored ambiguity attitude. That is, the former is 
ambiguity averse, with [ ]1 ( ) ( ) 0,1g bv s v s c− − = ∈  and the latter is ambiguity lover, with 
( ) ( ) 1g bv s v s c+ − = . Then, the reservation price for ambiguity resolution of the 
ambiguity lover DM will be greater, in absolute value, than the one set by the ambiguity 
averse DM. This is not true when the two DMs with opposite and mirrored ambiguity 
attitude are both risk neutral. 
Let  us now find the set of possible reservation prices in the less ambiguous setting, ( )β . 
In the ( )β  setting, maximum aversion to ambiguity is represented by ( ) gg
n
v s
n
= , 
( ) .bb
nv s
n
=  Then, V β  is implicitly determined by the relation 
11 
 
                 
,
( ) 2 ( ) ( ( ) ( )) g b
x x x
n n
u w x V u w x u w x u w x
n
β
=
++ − = + + + − +∑
                      
(10) 
If the DM is risk neutral, then ( )
2
g bn n nV x x
n
β − −= − . Maximum love for ambiguity is 
represented by ( ) bg
n nv s
n
−= , ( ) gb
n n
v s
n
−= . Then, V β  is implicitly determined by the 
relation 
                 
,
( ) 2 ( ) ( ( ) ( )) g b
x x x
n n
u w x V u w x u w x u w x
n
β
=
++ − = + − + − +∑
                      
(11) 
If the DM is risk neutral, then ( )
2
g bn n nV x x
n
β − −= − − , so that again 0V Vβ β+ = . 
Result 2 holds also in the ( )β  setting, i.e. 0V Vβ β+ <  if the DM is strictly risk averse. 
The four threshold values for the DM’s reservation price in settings ( )α  and ( )β  are 
related through the following expressions: 
         
( ) ( )
( )
,
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )
                        ( ) ( )
g b
x x x
x x x
n n
u w x u w x u w x V u w x V
n
u w x V u w x V
β α
α β
=
=
++ − + = + − − + − =
= + − − + −
∑
∑
      
(12) 
By comparing relation (5) to relation (10) we conclude that it is V Vβ α< , and, 
analogously, V V
β α>  from the comparison between (6) and (11). It follows 
, ,V V V Vβ β α α⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤⊂⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦ . Therefore, the interval of possible values that V can take is smaller 
the smaller the ambiguity of the setting, as formally stated below. Notice that this result 
holds whatever the DM’s risk attitude. If the DM is risk averse, we can also conclude that 
V V V Vα β α β− > − , i.e. when ambiguity is smaller the size of the decrease (in absolute 
value) of the DM’s reservation price if she is ambiguity lover is greater than the size of 
the decrease if she is ambiguity averse. This second statement follows from (12) and 
from the strict concavity of the utility function. Both these results are formally 
summarized below. 
Result 3. With reference to a Choquet expected utility DM, the set of rational reservation 
prices for ambiguity resolution shrinks with ( )g bn n+ , i.e. its size depends negatively on 
the level of ambiguity. If the DM is risk averse, the decrease in her reservation price is 
greater if she is ambiguity lover than if she is ambiguity averse. 
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From Result 3 it follows that, since 
2
( ) ( ) ,g b g bg b
n n n n n
v s v s
n n
β β + − −⎡ ⎤+ ∈ ⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, the DM, in 
stating V β , only takes into account the size of the ambiguity reduction. She does 
consider whether gn  is greater or smaller than bn . This means that, in switching from a 
more ambiguous to a less ambiguous act (e.g., from setting ( )α  to ( )β ), any variation of 
the likelihood of the favorable event in the act ga  due to the reduction in the ambiguity 
level with respect to ( )α  does not influence the DM’s reservation price for information 
in ( )β , if it is compensated by the opposite variation of the likelihood of the favorable 
event in the act ba  ( g bn n+  is constant). Suppose that the act is ( , ; , )g g ba x s x s= . Given 
that in the ( )β  setting the DM has no information about the minimum number of balls of 
h-color in the urn, she rationally perceives that the two events of the act are equally 
likely. Now, consider two different specifications of the ( )β  setting. In the first one, 
before buying information, the DM knows that there are at least (1)gn  and 
(1)
bn  balls in the 
urn, with (1) (1)g bn n> ; thus, in the act the favorable event is more likely. In the second one, 
the DM knows that there are at least (2)gn  and 
(2)
bn  balls in the urn, with 
(2) (2)
g bn n< ; thus, 
in the act the unfavorable event is more likely. Then, if it is (1) (2)g bn n=  and (1) (2)b gn n= , for 
given DM’s risk and ambiguity attitudes we would have the same V β  in the two cases. 
 
 
2.2    Buying Information and using it in the subsequent choice 
 
Consider an extension of the decision problem described in section 2.1. In this new 
version of the problem, if the DM buys the information about Pr( )gs  and Pr( )bs , she has 
the option to give up playing the lottery in case she does not “like” the revealed 
composition of the urn. The new decision problem, with respect to act ga ,  is represented 
in Figure 2. Branch Ag represents the choice of playing the act ( , ; , )g g ba x s x s= , so that 
the DM’s final wealth is equal to the initial one, , decreased by the price 0P≥  paid to 
participate in the act, and increased by the random outcome of the act, ( )gx a . Branch Ig 
represents the choice of buying information about the probabilities of the events of the 
act ga , by paying the price Vg.   
0w
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Figure 2. Choosing between an act, a lottery, or none of the two 
 
In case the DM decides to buy information, the probabilities of the events are fully 
revealed to her, so she faces a lottery determined by the act and the known probabilities 
of the events, namely ( ,Pr( ); ,Pr( ))g g bx s x s=A . In contrast to the problem analyzed in 
section 2.1, after having known the values of Pr( )gs  and Pr( )bs , the DM can choose 
between playing the resulting lottery gA  (branch Lg) and not playing it (branch Ng). If 
she chooses Lg, her wealth is 0 ( )g gw V P x− − + A , where ( )gx A  indicates the random 
outcome of the lottery; otherwise, she gives up with the lottery and saves P, so that her 
wealth is 0 gw V− . Notice that the participation price P does not necessarily belong to the 
interval .
6 However, in the analysis below we focus on the relevant case when 
. Notice also that the option of refusing to play is introduced only in branch Ig, 
not in branch Ag. Therefore, as in the previous decision problem (Figure 1), the DM 
cannot avoid playing the act if she does not buy information.7 
Again, let us determine the relation between the capacity of the favorable event, ( )gv s , 
and Vg, the DM’s reservation price for ambiguity resolution, by imposing that she is 
indifferent between branch Ag and branch Ig.  
                                                 
6 For example, if participating in the lottery were free, it would be 0P=  even with 0.x >  7 A different setting (different from the setting represented in Figure 2 and analyzed in section 2.2) could 
be proposed, where the DM has the option not to play even when not buying information. In this setting, 
the DM is left with 0w  if she decides not to play the act. 
[ ],x x
[ ],P x x∈
I g
Ng
gs  
bs  
Lg  
Ag  
ga  
0w P x− +  
0w P x− +  
Pr( )gs  
Pr( )bs  
gA  
0 gw V P x− − +  
0 gw V P x− − +  
0 gw V−  
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Before writing down this indifference condition, we need to calculate the expected utility 
when choosing branch Ig. This value is obtained through the comparison between 
branches Lg and Ng. In particular, the DM chooses Lg if the probability of the favorable 
event is sufficiently high, otherwise she chooses Ng. The indifference condition between 
these two choices allows to determine the probability threshold *Pr ( )gs
 
(and the threshold 
number of green balls *gn ), such that 
*( (Pr ( ))) ( )g g g gEU w V s u w V P− + = − +A , i.e. 
*
* ( ) ( )Pr ( )
( ) ( )
g g g
g
g g
n u w P V u w x V
s
n u w x V u w x V
+ − − + −= = + − − + −                                   (13) 
which exists if [ ],P x x∈ .8 Then, if the information received is *Pr( ) Pr ( )g gs s> , i.e. 
*
g gn n> , the DM chooses Lg; if instead it indicates *Pr( ) Pr ( )g gs s< , i.e. *g gn n< , the DM 
chooses Ng; and if it indicates *Pr( ) Pr ( )g gs s= , i.e. *g gn n= , the DM is indifferent 
between Lg and Ng. 
If the DM is risk neutral, then 
*
*Pr ( )g g
n P xs
n x x
−= = − . If she is not risk neutral, then, using 
the Taylor expansion of the DM’s utility function (as already done to find relation (4)), 
(13) can be rewritten as 
*
*
( )1 0.5 ( 2 )
( )Pr ( ) . ( )1 0.5 ( 2 )
( )
g
g
g
g
u w P x Vn P x u ws u wn x x x x V
u w
′′+ + −′−= = ′′− + + −′  
so that if ( ) ( )0
( )
u w
u w
′′ < >′ , then 
*
( )g
n P x
n x x
−> < −  
and 
*
gn
n
 is an increasing function of the de 
Finetti-Arrow-Pratt measure of  risk aversion, ( )
( )
u w
u w
′′− ′ . Therefore, Result 4 can be stated. 
Result 4. Suppose that the ambiguity averse Choquet expected utility DM decides to buy 
information that resolves ambiguity. Then, the minimum probability of the favorable 
outcome in order to accept playing the lottery is an increasing function of her degree of 
risk aversion. 
If the DM is not risk neutral, her probability threshold *Pr ( )gs  depends also on her 
ambiguity attitude, through gV . This is due to the fact that the DM’s reservation price for 
                                                 
8 In fact, if P x< , it is *Pr ( ) 0gs < , hence the DM chooses Lg for any information received. If it is P x> , 
then *Pr ( ) 1gs > and the DM chooses Ng for any information received. 
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ambiguity resolution is derived from the indifference condition between branch Ag and 
branch Ig, as a function of ( )gv s . 
Recalling that, by definition, , the expected utility of branch Ig is 
{ }*
*
*
( ) Pr( ) ( )
Pr( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( )
g g
g g g g
g g g g g g n n
EU I n n u w P V
n n u w x V u w x V u w x V s >
= ≤ ⋅ + − +
⎡ ⎤+ > ⋅ + − + + − − + −⎣ ⎦
  
where *Pr( )
g g
g n n
s >  is the probability that a green ball is drawn provided that the number of 
green balls in the urn is larger than *gn . 
Let us now write down the indifference condition between branch Ag and branch Ig, 
( ) ( )g gCEU w a EU I+ = . Being ( ) ( ) ( ( ) ( )) ( )g gCEU w a u w x u w x u w x v s+ = + + + − + , we 
can rewrite the indifference condition as  
*
*
*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Pr( ) Pr( )
                           
( ) ( )
g g
g g g g g
g
g g g g g n n
u w P V u w x u w P V u w x V n n
v s
u w x u w x
u w x V u w x V n n s
u w x u w x
>
⎡ ⎤+ − − + − + − − + − >⎣ ⎦= ++ − +
⎡ ⎤+ − − + − >⎣ ⎦+ + − +
       (14.a)    
If P x≤ , that is * 0gn = , so that *Pr( ) 1g gn n≥ =  and *Pr( ) Pr( )g gg gn ns s> = , we find that 
( )gv s  is determined by (1.a), the relation obtained for the decision problem in section 
2.1. Thus, we have the same expression for ( )gv s  for the two decision problems, because 
for P x≤  it is always profitable for the DM to participate in the lottery. 
If [ ],P x x∈ , the maximum price Vg the DM is willing to pay in order to know the 
probability Pr( )gs  depends not only on her degree of ambiguity aversion, but also on the 
possibility of not participating to the lottery if Pr( )gs  is too low. 
Let us now consider the analogous problem with the act ( , ; , )b b ga x s x s= in place of 
( , ; , )g g ba x s x s= . The probability threshold for indifference between Lg and Ng is  
*
* ( ) ( )Pr ( )
( ) ( )
b b b
b
b b
n u w P V u w x Vs
n u w x V u w x V
+ − − + −= = + − − + −  
and the indifference condition between the two branches leads to 
0w w P= −
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[ ]
[ ] *
*
*
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) Pr( )
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) Pr( ) Pr( )
                              +
( ) ( )
b b
b b b b b
b
b b b b b n n
u w P V u w x u w P V u w x V n n
v s
u w x u w x
u w x V u w x V n n s
u w x u w x
>
+ − − + − + − − + − >= ++ − +
+ − − + − >
+ − +
         
(14.b)  
           
 
Let us assume, as in section 2.1, that g bV V= , and indicate them with V. Thus, taking into 
account that Pr( ) Pr( ) 1g bs s+ =  and * * *b gn n n= = , we obtain from relations (14.a) and 
(14.b) the index of ambiguity aversion  
[ ]
[ ] *
*
,
*
,
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 2 Pr( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) 1 Pr( ) Pr( )
( ) ( )
h
g b
h
h g b
h h n n
h g b
u w x u w x V u w x u w x Vv s v s
u w x u w x
u w P V u w x V n n
u w x u w x
u w x V u w x V n n s
u w x u w x
=
>=
+ − + − + + − + −− − = ++ − +
⎛ ⎞+ − − + − − >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠− ++ − +
⎛ ⎞+ − − + − − >⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠+ + − +
∑
∑
        
(15) 
Relation (15) implies that V is an increasing function of the index of ambiguity aversion. 
This conclusion can be easily proved by deriving the right-hand side of relation (15) with 
respect to V and noting that the derivative is positive. 
The analytical expression (15) of the index of ambiguity aversion in the decision problem 
in Figure 2 differs from relation (2) because of the presence of additional terms which 
depend on the option value of information. With respect to the decision problem in 
Figure 1, the option value raises the DM’s maximum willingness to pay for the 
information, given her capacities, since the possibility of avoiding an unfavorable lottery 
is advantageous. When knowing /hn n  (the probability of the favorable outcome) she 
can avoid playing the lottery when hn  is too low with respect to the threshold number of 
h-color balls leading her to accept playing the lottery. The option value effect vanishes if 
P x≤ , because for such a low lottery price the DM never uses this option. 
If the DM is risk neutral (but not ambiguity neutral), we obtain  
*
* *
, ,
21 ( ) ( ) 2 Pr( ) 1 Pr( ) Pr( )
h
g b h h h n n
h g b h g b
V P xv s v s n n n n s
x x x x >= =
⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞−− − = − − > + − >⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟− − ⎝ ⎠ ⎝ ⎠∑ ∑
    
(16) 
which differs from (3) because of the option value (in relative terms) of information 
generated by the two choice problems respectively referred to act ( , ; , )g g ba x s x s=  and 
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act ( , ; , )b b ga x s x s= . The option value is equal to the expected loss generated by the 
DM’s participation to the lotteries hA  when *h hn n≤ , with , .h g b=  9     
In order to set V according to relation (15) or (16) we should know the probabilities 
*Pr( )hn n>  and *Pr( )
h
h n n
s >  for ,h g b= . Given that they are determined by the particular 
information setting of the decision problem, we must take into account what the DM 
knows about the act before she decides whether to buy information. Let us assume that 
the urn to which act ga  and ba  refer is randomly drawn from a “big urn”, composed of 
g
iN  urns with i green balls inside for 0,1,...,i n= , so that the total number of urns in the 
big urn is equal to 
0
n
g
i
i
N N
=
=∑ . Consequently, with respect to the blue balls, it is 
b g
i n iN N −= , for 0,1,...,i n= , since each urn contains only green and blue balls. Recall that 
* ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
u w P V u w x Vn n
u w x V u w x V
+ − − + −= + − − + −  is the threshold number of balls that makes the DM 
indifferent between playing and not playing the lottery after having bought information. 
Let **n  be the greatest integer smaller than or equal to *n , that is { }** *
0,1,...,
max :
i n
n i i n
=
= ≤ . 
Let us now resume the two comparative information settings introduced at the end of 
section 2.1, namely ( )α  and ( )β . We reinterpret the DM’s knowledge about the 
likelihood of the events of the act in terms of her knowledge about the composition of the 
big urn. 
In the ( )α  setting, it is g bi iN N k= = ∈` : the big urn is composed of an equal number of 
the different possible urns. Then, ( 1)N n k= + , 
**
**
*
1
1Pr( )
1
n
h
h i
i n
n nn n N
N n= +
−> = = +∑  for 
,h g b= , and *
**
** **
*
1
1 ( )( 1)Pr( ) Pr( )
2 ( 1)h
n
h
h h in n
i n
i n n n nn n s N
N n n n> = +
− + +> = = +∑  for ,h g b= . 
Taking into account these values, relation (15) becomes 
                                                 
9 This expected loss is ( )* *
,
( ) ( ) Pr( ) Pr( )
h
h hn n
h g b
P x x x s n n≤=
=− − − ≤∑  
( )* * **
,
Pr( ) Pr( ) Pr( )
( ) ( ) 1 Pr( )
1 Pr( )
h
h h hn n
h
h g b h
s s n n
P x x x n n
n n
>
=
=
⎛ ⎞− >⎜ ⎟− − − − >⎜ ⎟− >⎝ ⎠
∑   
*
* *
,,
( ) 2 Pr( ) ( ) 1 Pr( ) Pr( )
h
h h hn n
h g bh g b
P x n n x x s n n>
==
= − − > − − − >⎛ ⎞ ⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟ ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠⎝ ⎠ ∑∑ . 
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**
**
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 ( ) ( )
( ) ( )
2 ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )1 .
1 ( ) ( )
g b
u w x u w x u w x V u w x Vv s v s
u w x u w x
nu w P V u w x V u w x V u w x Vn n
n u w x u w x
α α
α α α α
+ + + − + − − + −− − = ++ − +
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ − − + − − + − − + −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦+− ⋅+ + − +  
Taking into account also that for a risk neutral DM it is 
*nP x
x x n
− =− (by definition of 
*Pr ( )gs ), relation (16) becomes 
** * **2 11 ( ) ( ) 2 .
1g b
V n n nv s v s
x x n n n
α ⎛ ⎞+− − = − −⎜ ⎟− + ⎝ ⎠
 Since 
** *n n≤ , with * **n n ε= +  and 1ε < , then [ ]** * **1 2 0,1
1
n n n
n n n
⎛ ⎞+ − ∈⎜ ⎟+ ⎝ ⎠
, where 0 
corresponds to * 0n =  and 1 to *n n= . Hence, for a risk neutral DM and for a given level 
of ambiguity aversion, the option value effect results in V  increasing with *n , i.e. with 
the participation price P. Notice that this result, formally stated below, has been obtained 
in the ( )α  setting, where the level of ambiguity is the greatest possible, given that every 
possible urn composition is equally likely. 
Result 5. For a risk neutral (but not ambiguity neutral) Choquet expected utility DM 
facing an act with the greatest level of ambiguity, the option value effect results in her 
reservation price for ambiguity resolution increasing with the participation price. 
In the ( )β  setting, recalling that hn  is the minimum number of h-color balls in each urn, 
we have 0giN =  for ,g bi n n n⎡ ⎤∉ −⎣ ⎦  and giN k=  for ,g bi n n n⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦ . Then, it is 0biN =  
for ,b gi n n n⎡ ⎤∉ −⎣ ⎦  and biN k=  for ,b gi n n n⎡ ⎤∈ −⎣ ⎦ . Moreover, ( 1 )g bN n n n k= + − − ,
*Pr( )hn n> =
** 1
1 n h
i
i n
N
N = +
=∑ ( )
( )
**
**
max 1,
1 max 1,1
1
h
h
n n
h h
g bi n n
n n n n
k
N n n n
−− −
= +
+ − − += + − −∑  for ,h g b= , 
and 
{ }* ** **
*
1 max 1,
1 1Pr( ) Pr( )
h
h
h
n nn
h
h h in n
i n i n n
i in n s N k
N n N n
−−
>
= + = +
> = =∑ ∑ , that is equal to
{ }( ) { }( )** **1 max 1, max 1,
2 ( 1 )
h h h h
g b
n n n n n n n n
n n n n
+ − − + − + +
+ − −  for ,h g b= . By substituting 
these values into relation (15), it is possible to characterize the DM’s ambiguity aversion 
index in the ( )β  setting, for a given attitude towards risk. If the DM is risk neutral, from 
relation (16) we obtain  
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( )
( )( ) ( )
( )( ) ( )( )
**
*
,
** **
,
* ** **
max 1,
21 ( ) ( )
1
max 1, 1 max 1, ( 1)
                                          
2 ( 1 )
2 1 max 1, max 1,
2
h g b
h g b
g b
g b
h h h h
h g b
g b
h h h h
n n n n
V nv s v s
x x n n n n
n n n n n n
n n n n
n n n n n n n
V
x x
β
β
=
=
+ − −
− − = − +− + − −
⎡ ⎤+ − + − −⎣ ⎦+ =+ − −
⎡ − + − + + −
= −−
∑
∑
,
2 ( 1 )
h g b
g bn n n n
=
⎤⎣ ⎦
+ − −
∑
 
Suppose that g bn n= . Then, if **1g bn n n= ≥ + , we find again relation (3) as in section 
2.1, since the no-play option is never exerted for any information obtained. If 
**1g bn n n= < + , we have ( ) ( )( )* ** **2 12 1 ( ) ( ) ( 1 )h hg b g b
n n n n n
V v s v s
x x n n n n
β ⎡ ⎤− − + −⎢ ⎥= − − +− + − −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦
, 
which characterizes the risk neutral DM’s reservation price in terms of her degree of 
ambiguity aversion and of the option value effect. The term embedding the option value 
effect, namely 
( )( )* ** **2 1
( 1 )
h h
g b
n n n n n
n n n n
− − + −
+ − − , is nonnegative (it is zero for 
**1 ,g bn n n= < +  
only if ** *hn n n= = ) and decreasing in hn . Therefore, the option value effect is 
maximum for 0hn =  ( ,h g b= ), i.e. in the ( )α  information setting, where the ambiguity 
level of the act is the greatest possible. This last result is formally stated below. 
Result 6. For a risk neutral (but not ambiguity neutral) Choquet expected utility DM, the 
reservation price (in relative terms) for ambiguity resolution is the sum of her degree of 
ambiguity aversion and the option value effect. The latter increases with the level of 
ambiguity of the decision setting. 
 
 
3. Conclusion 
 
Using the Choquet expected utility function, we have proposed a way to measure a 
subject’s ambiguity aversion by letting her reveal the maximum price she is willing to 
pay in order to receive information about the probability of an unknown event. Once this 
maximum willingness to pay is determined, it is possible to measure the subject’s 
ambiguity aversion through the implied capacity of the unknown event.  
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We have presented two possible decision problems in which ambiguity aversion can be 
easily captured in a laboratory experiment. In the first problem, an ambiguity averse 
decision maker prefers paying in order just to know probabilities, given that she cannot 
use this information for a subsequent choice. In this simple setting, the additional effect 
of risk aversion on the decision maker’s reservation price for ambiguity resolution has 
been studied. In particular, we have shown how ambiguity aversion and risk aversion 
have opposite effects on the decision maker’s reservation price for ambiguity resolution. 
Furthermore, risk aversion produces different effects on the reservation price of an 
ambiguity averse and of an ambiguity lover subject. 
In the second problem, due to the possibility to use the information received in order to 
choose whether to play or not play the resulting lottery, the traditional option value of 
information emerges. In this slightly complex setting, we have examined how the option 
value affects the decision maker’s willingness to pay for ambiguity resolution. We have 
found that, in the case where the decision maker buys information, the minimum 
probability of the favorable outcome in order to accept playing the lottery is an 
increasing function of her degree of risk aversion. With respect to the reservation price, 
we have found its relevant relations with the decision maker’s risk and ambiguity 
attitudes and with the option value. However, we have not found qualitative results for 
the case when the decision maker is risk averse. If instead risk neutrality prevails, the role 
of ambiguity aversion and that of the option value can be disentangled. Due to the option 
value effect, the risk neutral decision maker’s reservation price for ambiguity resolution 
increases with the participation price (in the act or in the lottery). This effect increases 
with the level of ambiguity in the decision setting. 
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